

The Platonic Aristotle

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Werner Jaeger's revolutionary book on Aristotle has solved a problem, which Hegel¹ in his *History of Philosophy* recommended to the *Scharfsinn der höheren Kritik*, which should explain why Aristotle's *Metaphysics* contains incompatible pieces. Aristotle's development is, according to Jaeger, that of a scientific genius, which in his youth is overwhelmed by Plato's philosophy, but asserts itself in his mature years. In those mature years Aristotle becomes the collector of factual-scientific knowledge, the founder of sciences and philosophical disciplines, the organizer of collective research. If this hypothesis is correct, then we should find in the earlier layers of his *Metaphysics*², which Jaeger has established on philological and historical grounds, Aristotle's pre-Aristotelian Platonism.

Platonism defines itself literally as philosophy, "love of wisdom", in Aristotle's early language ἐπιζητούμενη ἐπιστήμη, a "longed-for knowledge". This longing search is Plato's ascent of the human soul knowing itself as such a movement. As dialectical it is a continual settlement of a struggle. Man expands as his vision of reality expands. What is evident to his living vision can also be thought, formulated logically. But a rational formulation not supported by vision remains mute and helpless.

In this dynamic movement of the whole man, Plato distinguished four levels, always correlative to levels of reality. The first level is perceptual evidence, unstable sense appearance, vital appetites, private business, rule of the mass-mind, sensual art as imitation of appearances and trivial emotions, demonological religion. Left to itself, this level perverts itself to insanity and tyranny of passions. The second level

¹ HEGEL, *Werke* (Froman, Stuttgart), *Geschichte der Philosophie*, XVIII, p. 309.

² Books 1-4, 13, 14, Book 11 chapters 1-8, and book 12 except chapter 8.

is that of rational hypotheses, by which appearances are discovered to behave partly according to laws. The hypothesis can be shared by those willing to make the effort. They can agree on common concepts and procedures. This scientific level, hence, is the possibility of a human community. It corresponds to legal order in the state, managed by those who understand it, to virtues of measure and loyalty in the individual, to education in the disciplines of fine and liberal arts, and to a religion where God becomes evident as a helper of good intentions. Left to itself this level perverts itself into a dogmatism of pride and achieved unity. The third level of the soul transcends factual sciences and states by keeping open an infinite vision of tasks and ideals. It is the level of wisdom and justice, able to distinguish and to unite the many aspects of living reality; it "gives each his due" and avoids confusion of levels and values. The fourth level is the immortal and self-moving world-soul, which is evident through the non-absoluteness and non-finality of all other levels or reality, whose orders and values are tokens pointing towards their unconditional and total unity as their ground as well as their goal. This whole of reality is a dialectical whole, in which its own "non-being" is preserved in its limitation. Philosophy, ultimately or metaphysically, participates in this dialectic of a concrete self-differentiating unity. It knows itself as inadequate expression of the unconditional self-moving whole, which appears as the idea of the good for ethical faith, as truth for knowledge, and as beauty for appreciation and aesthetic joy. The relation of the four levels is stated in the Platonic Law of Value: if you prefer the lower value, you not only lose the higher, but also pervert the lower.

It can be shown that the early Aristotle, as Hegel observes¹, "carries out what Plato's principle began".

Aristotle begins his independent philosophical career as a true reformer of Platonism, against those "newer thinkers", who have no right even to praise Plato. Against those former fellow-Platonists he states what Platonism is not. They: 1. misunderstand ideas as if they were duplicates of material things²; 2. they absolutize numbers; 3. they degrade the idea of the good saying that it is a gradual product of natural evolution.

¹ HEGEL, *ib.* p. 298.

² 997 b.

1. Being (*οὐσία*) does not consist of abstract general concepts. General predicates which many things have in common are not that which they describe. Being is individuated, and individual beings are opposites to class concepts in which they are thought. "All philosophers agree in positing those principles as opposites. (*πάντες δὲ ποιοῦσιν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐναντίας*). "All things which are generated from their opposites involve an underlying subject; a subject, then, must be present in the case of opposites, if anywhere. All opposites, then, are always predicable of a subject, and none can exist apart, but just as appearance suggests (*φαίνεται*) that there is nothing contrary to Being (*οὐσία*), so reason (*λόγος*) confirms it. No opposite is the first principle of all things in the concrete sense, the first principle (*κυρίως ἀρχή*) is something different"¹. This is the Platonic One Being, evident to vision, thought by dialectical reason as the unity of opposites, such as being and non-being, eternal and temporal.

2. Against the Platonists who absolutize numbers (as also the English Plato translation of Jowett does) Aristotle restores the Platonic idea of number as a hypothesis, serving to read the given world of changing appearances as being related in quantitative patterns. Aristotle distinguishes, like Plato, between the mathematical number "One", symbolizing a material unit of measurement, which is equal or unequal to another unit; from the logical concept of "number one", which is the logical identity of many equal numbers. Logical identity is not identical with mathematical equality. The eternal, absolute Being does not consist of mathematical elements: "no matter how everlasting number or anything else that has matter, is, it must be capable of not existing; just as that which is a number of years old is as capable of not existing, so is that which has lasted for a time so long that it has no limits. Numbers, then, cannot be eternal"².

3. The one and absolute Being cannot be mathematically increased or decreased in size or magnitude. All determinations of Being are self-determinations of its everpresent actuality. They are products (*πάθη*) of its absolute activity, which produces itself through mutual and active interrelations of its individual selfmodifications³. This concrete universe of Being is also the good, which need not and cannot

¹ 1087 b.

² 1088 b.

³ 1089 b.

be brought about, but in which we participate through *theoria*. "It would be strange if to that which is primary and eternal and self-sufficient this very quality —self-sufficiency and self-maintenance— should belong in any other way than as a good. But indeed, it can be in no other reason indestructible and self-sufficient than because its nature is good". If this concrete and absolute Being is confused with "absolute number", then "on this assumption all the abstract units become identical with a species of good, and there is a great profusion of goods". Now "some thinkers of the present day (Speusippos, the head of the Academy) say that both the good and the beautiful appear in the nature of things only when that nature has made some progress", and this their natural evolution of the good is based on their quantitative dismembering of the One¹.

After stating that Platonism is not positing "eternal sensible substances" as meaningless duplicates of material things, Aristotle continues restating the Platonic dialectical movement of the soul from experience to the idea of the whole. It is not merely a matter of reason, but also of faith and wonder, intellectual intuition, aesthetic joy, and practical-moral evaluations. That man is human insofar as he is philosophical would make no sense, if philosophy were only one science among other sciences. It is the liberating process of the soul rising from bondage to freedom. (*Book A*).

That there is Being, and that it is at any moment that which it is, that it is a determinate Being is the first article in the philosophic creed. It is the truth presupposed by any special kind of knowledge or argument. Sciences never deal with being *qua* being, because they are selective and regional. This ontological truth is the basis of the logical principle of identity and non-contradiction, which says that we must mean what we say and say what we mean. This is not merely a linguistic convention, "for what a man says he must not necessarily believe"². To demand proof for it is due to "a want of training in logic". "For a principle which everyone must have who understands anything that is, is not a hypothesis"³.

But it is impossible to verify our philosophical faith in experience, as experience is never wholly true or false but always a mixture of

¹ 1091 a 35.

² 1005 b 25.

³ 1005 b 1015.

both¹. Only partial truths are accessible in it. The reason for this does not lie in reality, but in us. Although reality is the same in me who knows and in you who are known (*ἀρχὴ καὶ ὅλον*), we nevertheless are conditioned in seeing reality by our position in becoming and by our individual perspective. "Becoming is between being and non-being, so that which is becoming is always between which is and that which it is not; learning is a man of knowledge in becoming"². We can merely learn and expand our vision, as there is a correlation between degrees of knowledge and the degrees in which reality is more widely or more narrowly disclosed. "For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of the day, so is reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident to all"³. Our individual perspective is the principle of relativity and appearance *qua* appearance. "That which appears is apparent to someone: so that he who says only things that appear are true, makes all things relative. . . the truth is not that what appears exists, but that what appears exists for him to whom it appears, and when, and to the sense to which, and under what conditions under which it appears"⁴. The immediate world appearing to our senses in changing constellations and surprising perspectives is the realm of the irrational (*συμβεβηκός, ἀόριστον*). It is only partly amenable to identity and causal relations. The metaphysical standpoint which confuses it with reality is naturalism (nature is only a segment of reality)⁵, empiricism, skepticism. They condemn the whole as irrational for the sake of the part to which they cling. This is the confusion of sophistry⁶.

This brings us to the second level. No man can become wise by himself. He must compare his results with others. If several reports agree among themselves, then it is probable that they also agree in fact⁷. Degrees of error show that one may come closer to truth than another. We must learn from history to avoid errors and to enjoy agreements with others, far removed from us in time⁸. Maturing philosophy

¹ 1012 b.

² 994 a 28-30.

³ 993 b.

⁴ 1011 a.

⁵ 1005 a.

⁶ 983 b 7.

⁷ 1008 b, 1010 a.

⁸ 1006 b.

may be compared with the growth of art, where one expression does not obviate a previous one, but all enrich the beautiful κόσμος of human expression¹.

Human knowledge begins when the search of truth is enjoyed for its own sake². Impressions and memories are collected into a unifying concept, which *intends* to apprehend that which is, regardless of whether it appears agreeable or disagreeable to animal pragmatic interests. Scientifically unified experience can be technically applied. Τέχνη demonstrates that rules do not only operate in the mind but also partially in nature. Scientific experience and art free man from nature and make room for his self-realization in the liberal and creative arts. Self-criticism and self-command bring about moral problems in the freedom for values³.

Hegel⁴ comments on this movement, that Aristotle here practices true θεωρία, which he could not have done, had he followed the abstract thinking of his own formal logic. Formal logic abstracts from individuals and their concrete life; it separates general predicates or class terms, which many given objects have in common; it excludes and includes those classes in or from more general classes, losing content at each step of abstraction. The speculative logic of philosophy, as practiced in the metaphysics, on the contrary, thinks real individuals as they fill themselves with more and more content, approaching truth, organized in actual sciences and arts. Abstract thinking is itself one of those concrete, creative human activities. This movement mediates the individual and the absolute. The individual reaches self-knowledge by participating in reality. Aristotle corroborates this by saying: "Everything that is common indicates not a "this", but a "such", but Being (οὐσία) is a "this". Both the absolute and the individual are "this one only"⁵.

On the third Platonic level Aristotle discusses principles, assumed by various kinds of knowledge, such as mathematics, physics, medicine, or music. They disclose various essential realms of reality, which

¹ 1076 a.

² 993 b.

³ 982 b.

⁴ HEGEL, *ib.* p. 415.

⁵ 1003 b.

are essential, because they cannot be reduced to each other or stated in terms of the others¹.

The one reality is a unity of such opposites². They all *are*, they characterize reality. Or, the everpresent Being presents itself through its essential characters, it is neither identical with them nor apart from them. These universal essential realms of Being (*γένη*), can be thought. As expressed forms of thought they are categories³. They are undefinable, because there are no more general forms to define them in, but they are ontologically founded. The individuals lose their indefinite potentiality and accidentality in so far as they fill themselves with such essential forms and contents of reality.

All opposites in reality and in thought are unified in logic. It is correlative to the unity of Being. Identity, non-contradiction and consistency are *a priori* principles of reason. They cannot be proved, because all proof depends on them. But their disproof is impossible, because to disprove them implies their acceptance. They are not derivable from factual experience, they serve on the contrary to criticize experience.

Logic and mathematics partly determine the material appearance of reality. The appearing and disappearing of things in becoming is the category of qualitative change or history. Becoming can be measured mathematically as increase or decrease of magnitude in units of equal or unequal, similar or dissimilar; physically as change of movement and rest, or change in location; chemically as alteration of qualitative processes in individual things⁴.

The final level is concerned with the Platonic idea of the absolute. In Aristotle's language, it is concerned with being *qua* being, as it manifests itself in nature as well as in human culture. Aristotle oscillates between the Platonic dialectic unity of opposites and his own dualism, which seeks the absolute as "something eternal, independent, which can exist apart by itself"⁵. We disregard this dualistic line, which later engendered further "sensible eternal substances" (*Book XII ch. 8*) and keep to the Platonic dialectic in Aristotle.

The Platonic dialectic is pursued when the one and all-embracing

¹ 1003 a.

² 1004 a.

³ 997 a.

⁴ 1069 a.b.

⁵ 1060 a.

absolute reality is thought as the unity of itself and its own other¹. It can be thought, but not experientially known, although all knowledge ultimately intends it. Reality transcends finite knowledge, its being is more than being-thought, but all acts of intention and judgment are real also. Thinking-itself essentially characterizes Being. Being *thought* is inseparable from *being* thought. If we actualize it in *theoria*, the absolute actualizes itself².

The same dialectic discloses the absolute as final cause or the good. The good life is a harmonious life, agreeing with itself. But harmony implies opposites out of which harmony is to be restored. In finite life this is impossible to achieve, because we depend on shifting circumstances beyond our control. The absolute contains all opposites within itself and nothing is beyond its control. We actualize our good in becoming aware of our absolute dependence on reality, which is the untorn unity of all opposites³. In experience it is never certain why some individual should have such and such qualities and not others. But we know *a priori* that it will always have some definite character. The necessity of Being is thus thought in spite of the contingency of experience. We therefore say that "the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in the good state, in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder . . . and life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say, therefore, that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; for this is God"⁴.

The celebrated fourfold causal analysis of "composite substances" was introduced as analysis of the material world; it rises to eminence in the later scientific Aristotle. But the unity of his *Metaphysics* is provided by his earlier Platonism. It is an existential and dialectical movement of the whole soul towards the whole of reality within that whole. "The final cause, then, produces motion as being loved, but all other things move by being moved"⁵.

¹ 1004 a.

² 1072 a.

³ 1072 b.

⁴ 1072 b.

⁵ 1072 b.

In summary

- I. Absolute reality is *evident* to faith as the ground of that faith.
- II. The *ontological necessity* of absolute reality is identical with its impossibility not to be or to be other than it is.
- III. The *logical necessity* to think the Absolute as the ground of faith is identical with the impossibility to think the Absolute as not being or as being other than it is.
- IV. The absolute reality is rational in itself: its rationality is the *universality* of its ideal existence (that it *is*) and of its ideal essence (*what it is*). It offers its rationality to all beings able to *share* this rationality in *theoria*.
- V. A philosophical faith logically *justifies itself* as faith in absolute reality. This logical justification is identical with the self-assertion of reason as that universally open form, which can receive and formulate the rationality of the Absolute as it's (reason's) own law (νόησις νοήσεως).
- VI. The Absolute is *dialectical* in that it reveals its necessity and universality through the unnessessity (contingency) and fragmentariness (non-universality) of all its own contrary and contradictory manifestations, which are both posited and cancelled in its life. We are wise and good in contradicting what is foolish and evil; God is wise and good in transcending and circumsceding our self-contradiction and incompetence.
- VII. This makes *impossible a non-dialectical dualism*: in experience events are causally related in time, "moving by being moved". But the whole of reality, in which all experience and all kinds of experience take place, is not related in time to anything preceding it or different from it. Reality cannot be thought as an "effect" of a "cause" outside of itself.

[TRADUCCIÓN]

El Aristóteles platónico

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El libro revolucionario de Werner Jaeger sobre Aristóteles ha solucionado un problema que Hegel¹, en su *Historia de la Filosofía*, encomendó a la *Scharfsinn der höheren Kritik (agudeza de la más alta crítica)*, la que debería explicar por qué la *Metafísica* de Aristóteles contiene trozos incompatibles entre sí. El desenvolvimiento de Aristóteles es, según Jaeger, el de un genio científico que en su juventud se encuentra oprimido por la filosofía de Platón, pero que se afirma a sí mismo en su madurez. En aquellos años de madurez, Aristóteles se convierte en el compilador de un conocimiento fáctico-científico, el fundador de ciencias y disciplinas filosóficas, el organizador de la investigación colectiva. Si esta hipótesis es exacta, debemos encontrar en los más tempranos estratos de su *Metafísica*², lo que Jaeger ha establecido sobre bases filológicas e históricas: el platonismo pre-aristotélico de Aristóteles.

El Platonismo se define a sí mismo, literalmente, como filosofía, "amor por la sabiduría", y, en el temprano lenguaje de Aristóteles, ἐπιζητουμένη ἐπιστήμη, "un conocimiento ansiado". Esta búsqueda anhelante es el ascenso platónico del alma humana que se conoce a sí misma como tal movimiento. En cuanto dialéctica, es la continua pacificación de una contienda. El hombre se expande a medida que su visión de la realidad se expande. Lo que es evidente para su viva visión, puede también ser pensado, formulado lógicamente. Pero una formulación racional no corroborada por la visión permanece muda y sin apoyo.

En este movimiento dinámico de todo el hombre, Platón distinguía cuatro planos que se corresponden con planos de la realidad. El primero lo constituye la evidencia perceptiva, la inestable apariencia de los sentidos, los apetitos vitales, asuntos privados, gobierno de la opinión de las masas, arte sensual como imitación de apariencias y de emociones triviales, religión demonológica. Abandonado a sí mismo, este plano degenera en locura y tiranía de las pasiones. El segundo plano es el de la hipótesis racional, por la cual se descubre que las apariencias se comportan, en parte, de acuerdo a leyes. La hipótesis puede ser compartida por todos aquellos que quieran realizar el esfuerzo necesario. Pueden ellos convenir sobre conceptos y procedimientos comunes. De aquí que este nivel científico constituya la posibi-

¹ HEGEL, *Werke* (Froman, Stuttgart), *Geschichte der Philosophie*, XVIII, p. 309.

² Libros 1-4, 13-14; libro 11 capítulos 1-8 y libro 12 excepto el capítulo 8.

Condenan al todo como irracional por amor a la parte a que se aferran. Ésta es la confusión de la sofística¹.

Esto nos conduce al segundo nivel. Nadie puede llegar a ser sabio por sí mismo. Debe comparar sus adquisiciones con las de otros. Si varios informes concuerdan entre sí, recién entonces es probable que también concuerden en los hechos². Los grados del error muestran que uno puede acercarse a la verdad más que otro. Debemos aprender de la historia a evitar errores y a disfrutar del acuerdo con otros, por lejos que estén de nosotros en el tiempo³. La filosofía que madura puede ser comparada con el crecimiento del arte, en el que una expresión no elimina a otra anterior, sino que todas enriquecen el hermoso κόσμος de la expresión humana⁴.

El conocimiento humano comienza cuando la búsqueda de la verdad es gustada por la verdad misma⁵. Las impresiones y los recuerdos son reunidos en un concepto unificador, que *intenta* aprehender lo que es, aparezca o no agradable a los intereses pragmáticos animales. La experiencia científicamente unificada puede ser aplicada técnicamente. La τέχνη demuestra que las reglas no sólo operan en la mente, sino también, parcialmente, en la naturaleza. La experiencia científica y el arte liberan al hombre de la naturaleza, y dan lugar a su autorealización en las artes liberales y creadoras. La autocrítica y el dominio de sí mismo traen aparejados problemas morales en la libertad para los valores⁶.

Hegel⁷, comentando este movimiento, dice que Aristóteles practica la verdadera θεωρία, lo cual no habría podido llegar a hacer si hubiera seguido el pensamiento abstracto de su propia lógica formal. La lógica formal hace abstracción de los individuos y de su vida concreta; separa los predicados generales o términos de clase que muchos objetos dados tienen en común; excluye e incluye aquellas clases en otras más generales o las separa de ellas, perdiendo así contenido en cada paso de la abstracción. La lógica especulativa de la filosofía, tal como es practicada en la metafísica, piensa, por el contrario, individuos reales que se van llenando progresivamente de mayor contenido, aproximándose a la verdad, organizada en ciencias y artes efectivas. El pensar abstracto es, en sí mismo, una de esas actividades humanas concretas y creadoras. Este movimiento media entre lo individual y lo absoluto. El individuo alcanza su autoconocimiento al participar en la realidad. Aristóteles lo corrobora al decir: "Todo lo que es común indica no un "esto", sino un "tal", pero el Ser, οὐσία, es un "esto". Tanto lo absoluto como el individuo son "este algo solamente"⁸.

¹ 983 b 7.

² 1008 b., 1010 a.

³ 1006 b.

⁴ 1076 a.

⁵ 993 b.

⁶ 982 b.

⁷ HEGEL, *ib.* p. 415.

⁸ 1003 b.

En el tercer nivel platónico, Aristóteles discute los principios supuestos por varias clases de conocimientos, tales como las matemáticas, la física, la medicina o la música. Descubren ellos varios reinos esenciales de la realidad, que son esenciales porque no pueden ser reducidos los unos a los otros, ni expresados en términos propios a los demás¹.

La realidad única es una unidad de tales opuestos². Todos ellos *son*, todos caracterizan a la realidad. O sea, el Ser siempre presente se manifiesta a sí mismo a través de sus caracteres esenciales; no es ni idéntico a ellos, ni existe aparte de ellos. Estos reinos esenciales y universales del Ser (γένη) pueden ser pensados. Como formas expresadas del pensamiento, son categorías³. Son indefinibles, porque no hay formas más generales en las cuales definir las, pero están ontológicamente fundadas. Los individuos pierden su indefinida potencialidad y accidentalidad en tanto se llenan con esas formas y contenidos esenciales de la realidad.

Todos los opuestos en la realidad y en el pensamiento son unificados en la lógica. Ella es correlativa a la unidad del Ser. La identidad, la no contradicción y la coherencia son principios *a priori* de la razón. No pueden ser probados, porque toda prueba depende de ellos. Pero su refutación es imposible, porque dicha refutación implica su aceptación. No son derivables de la experiencia fáctica. Sirven, por el contrario, para criticar la experiencia.

La lógica y las matemáticas determinan en parte la apariencia material de la realidad. El aparecer y desaparecer de las cosas en devenir es la categoría del cambio cualitativo o historia. El devenir puede ser medido matemáticamente como aumento o disminución de magnitud, en unidades de lo igual o desigual, semejante o desemejante; físicamente, como cambio de movimiento y reposo, o como cambio de lugar; químicamente, como alteración de los procesos cualitativos en las cosas individuales⁴.

El nivel final concierne a la idea platónica de lo absoluto. En el lenguaje de Aristóteles, se refiere al ser en cuanto ser, tal como se manifiesta en la naturaleza y en la cultura humana. Aristóteles oscila entre la dialéctica platónica de la unidad de los opuestos y su propio dualismo, que busca la absoluto como "algo eterno, independiente, que puede existir aparte y de por sí"⁵. Dejamos de lado esta línea dualística, que más tarde engendró "substancias eternas sensibles" (*Libro XII*, c. 8), y nos atenemos a la dialéctica platónica en Aristóteles.

Se sigue la dialéctica platónica cuando la única y omnicomprensiva realidad absoluta es pensada como la unidad de sí misma y de su propia alteridad⁶. Puede ser pensada, pero no conocida empíricamente, aunque

1 1003 a.

2 1004 a.

3 997 a.

4 1069 ab.

5 1060 a.

6 1004 a.

todo conocimiento, en último término, tiende hacia ella. La realidad trasciende el conocimiento finito; su ser es algo más que ser pensado, pero todos los actos intencionales y judicativos son reales también. El pensarse a sí mismo caracteriza esencialmente al Ser. El ser *pensado* es inseparable del ser pensado. Si lo actualizamos en la *theoria*, lo absoluto se actualiza a sí mismo¹.

La misma dialéctica revela a lo absoluto como causa final o el bien. La vida buena es vida armoniosa, que concuerda consigo misma. Pero la armonía implica los opuestos, a partir de los cuales la armonía debe ser reconstruída. En la vida finita esto es inalcanzable, porque dependemos de circunstancias mutables, que escapan a nuestro control. Lo absoluto contiene dentro de sí todos los opuestos y nada escapa a su dominio. Realizamos nuestro bien al tomar conciencia de nuestra absoluta dependencia con respecto a la realidad, que es la unidad irrompible de todos los opuestos². En la experiencia nunca resulta seguro por qué algunos individuos tienen tales y cuales cualidades y no otras. Pero sabemos *a priori* que siempre tendrán algún carácter definido. La necesidad del Ser es así pensada, pese a la contingencia de la experiencia. Por lo tanto, decimos que "el acto de contemplación es lo más gozoso y lo mejor. Luego, si Dios está siempre en este estado feliz en el que nosotros sólo a veces nos hallamos, ello mueve nuestra admiración... y la vida también pertenece a Dios; porque la actualidad de la inteligencia es vida, y Dios es esa actualidad; y la independiente actualidad de Dios es la vida más perfecta y eterna. Decimos, por tanto, que Dios es un ser viviente, eterno, perfecto, de manera que la vida y la duración continua y eterna pertenecen a Dios; porque esto mismo es Dios"³.

El celebrado análisis causal cuádruple de las "sustancias compuestas" fué introducido como un análisis del mundo material; en el Aristóteles científico posterior tiende a ocupar un lugar descollante. Pero la unidad de su metafísica es fruto de su más temprano platonismo. Es un movimiento existencial y dialéctico de la totalidad del alma hacia la totalidad de lo real dentro de aquella totalidad. "La causa final, por ende, mueve al ser amada; pero todas las otras cosas mueven por ser movidas"⁴.

En resumen:

- I. La absoluta realidad se hace *evidente* a la fe como fundamento de esa fe.
- II. La *necesidad ontológica* de la realidad absoluta es idéntica con su imposibilidad de no ser o de ser distinta de lo que es.
- III. La *necesidad lógica* de pensar lo Absoluto como el fundamento de la fe, es idéntica con la imposibilidad de pensar lo Absoluto como no siendo o como siendo distinto de lo que es.

¹ 1072 a.

² 1072 b.

³ 1072 b.

⁴ 1072 b.

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- IV. La realidad absoluta es racional en sí misma: su racionalidad es la *universalidad de su existencia ideal* (el que sea) y de su esencia ideal (lo que es). Ofrece su racionalidad a todos los seres capaces de *compartir* esa racionalidad en la *theoria*.
- V. Una fe filosófica *se justifica* lógicamente como fe en la realidad absoluta. Esta justificación lógica *se identifica* con la auto-afirmación de la razón como aquella forma universalmente abierta, que puede recibir y formular la racionalidad de lo Absoluto como su propia ley (νόησις νοήσεως).
- VI. Lo absoluto es *dialéctico* en cuanto revela su necesidad y universalidad a través de la no necesidad (contingencia) y fragmentariedad (no universalidad) de todas sus propias manifestaciones contrarias y contradictorias, que son puestas y canceladas a la par en su propia vida. Somos sabios y buenos al contradecir lo insensato y lo malo; Dios es sabio y bueno porque trasciende y circunvala nuestra auto-contradicción e incapacidad.
- VII. Esto hace *imposible un dualismo no dialéctico*: en la experiencia, los sucesos están causalmente relacionados en el tiempo, "móviendo porque son movidos". Pero el todo de la realidad, en el que toda experiencia y toda clase de experiencia tiene lugar, no está relacionado en el tiempo con nada que le preceda o le sea diferente. La realidad no puede ser pensada como "efecto" de una "causa" que existiera fuera de ella.